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worked out community policies and techniques in comparison with which our procedure is incoherent, insequent, and heterogeneous.

*Sozialpolitik* is the leading case in point. To begin with, we have in the United States no such thing as *Sozialpolitik* in the strict sense. Accordingly we have no way of translating the word that will convey to our minds precisely what the term connotes to the Germans. Yet in Germany *Sozialpolitik* is a division of public function only a degree less important, and scarcely a degree less established and equipped than public education. The contrast has not to be simulated by ignoring all that is represented by the agencies formally or sympathetically federated in such bodies as the National Conference of Social Work, and the Southern Sociological Congress. The men and women who have most splendidly served our public by founding and operating their organizations would be the best witnesses to the reality of the contrast.

This being the case, every American who is interested either in the clinical practice or in the theoretical teaching of what we are now calling "social work" should welcome any means of promoting acquaintance with "social work" in Germany. Whether there is, or ever will be, a place in our American life for *Sozialpolitik* in the German sense is quite beside the mark. Be that as it may, the fact of belated groups within the national group is universal. Knowledge of what to do and how to do it, in view of this fact, is not intuitive. What to do is probably not in detail the same in any two national groups. What has been thought and what has been attempted in one group can hardly be without instructiveness for others.

Professor von Wiese's book is not a thesaurus. It is an introduction. We have no equally convenient conspectus of just what *Sozialpolitik* means in Germany, both as a theory and as a practice. Acquaintance with the contents of this book should form a part of the training of every American candidate for a place in "social work."

ALBION W. SMALL

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*The New Psychology.* By A. G. TANSLEY. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1920. Pp. 283. \$4.00.

*Man's Unconscious Passion.* By WILFRID LAY, PH.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1920. Pp. vii + 246. \$2.00.

*The Psychology of Social Reconstruction.* By G. T. W. PATRICK, PH.D. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920. Pp. 273. \$2.00.

These three books make the laudable attempt to develop and apply the new psychology—the theory of the behavior of man not immediately

controlled by the foreconsciousness—to an interpretation and solution of the problems of individual life and society. The very great value of this tendency no one should wish to question. As a revolt against the earlier intellectualistic interpretation, which assumed that even the most inconsequential acts were the result of “reason,” there could be no healthier sign, either in psychology or in sociology, than this tendency to seek for causation outside the books of logic, even within the inner and hidden corners of the mind. This omniscience and omnipotence of reason was a myth, and only by the slaughter of the mythical, almost mystical, rationalism can we achieve that further analysis of psychic causation which will enable us to establish a revised theory of intellectual control based on the tested facts of science instead of its mythology.

Tansley has written a systematic treatise on the psychology of the unconscious. He has reduced the largely empirical treatment of Freud and his followers to the systematic basis of principles. He begins the main body of his treatise with a clear and careful analysis of the structure of the mind, focusing on a description of the nature of the neural processes and the response to stimulus. From this he proceeds to a clear discussion of the nature of the unconscious and develops his theory of complexes, repression, conflicts, rationalization, dreams, etc. So long as he sticks closely to a description of these relatively concrete and well-established processes, which are within the powers of observation of everyone, he is on safe ground and offers a psychological analysis of the greatest value, going beyond most Freudians in insight respecting the working of the unconscious aspects of the human mind.

But he has not detached himself completely from the idols of the Freudians. His continuance of the “libido” myth is wholly inexcusable. For a psychologist, of all people not to be able to see that the “libido” is merely an unanalyzed metaphysical concept, instead of a definable reality, would be incomprehensible, if we did not reflect how phrase and form and ritual encumber and retard the development of science as well as human conduct. Another major error in this book is the selection of the three “great dominant instincts” of self, herd, and sex, around which he assembles practically all of the complexes and conflicts of mental life, without realizing that these also are abstract concepts or class names instead of indivisible native impulses. The trouble is that he defines his instincts from the standpoint of social organization and function instead of neural, structural organization and functioning. Consequently his instincts, and his theories based upon them, are far

removed from the observable facts. Psychologists must learn that instincts are inherited neural, structural organizations and not class terms to describe social organization. Until they do learn this simple fact they will not have gotten out of the habit of writing fables—however interesting to fable readers—into that of contributing to scientific analysis. That there is much valuable material regarding the hidden springs of man's action even in these chapters devoted to the unravelling of the secret relations of these three dominant "instincts" is, however, perfectly true, and the book is to be highly commended to the adventurous and critical reader.

*Man's Unconscious Passion* is a highly diluted treatise on the ramifications of sex in the unconsciousness, suited rather to the beginner than to the habitual reader of the new psychology. The author's distinction between affection and passion has some value, and the suggestions he gives for the detection of sex motives in conduct where they might not be suspected will aid in developing in the lay reader—especially of the sanctimonious type who sees beams in other peoples' eyes—that insight with regard to himself which could be most helpful. His explanation of aversions, although not new, is clearly put. Altogether the book is in the nature of a running disquisition rather than of a systematic treatise. Nor will the critical reader be inclined to accept all his views without question, such as, for instance, his assertion that disease is a form of fear and that headache is self-love (p. 17).

In *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction* Professor Patrick has attempted to apply some aspects of the new psychology, especially the theory of the instincts, to the solution of social problems. He was convinced that present-day reconstruction programs are merely mechanical, emphasizing the external and the economic aspects of life to the neglect of the inner nature of man and the not-to-be-denied demands of the instincts. His sarcasm with the Utopists—among whom he includes the social theorists with relationalistic plans for social salvation (he singles out [pp. 209, 234] Hobhouse and Ellwood for specific mention)—is sometimes biting. He accuses all such, in effect, of having constructed an automobile without the engine, the motive force which makes it go—the instinctive sanctions. No plan for social reform which does not make its peace with the instincts, seducing them into service to this intellectually planned master, or perhaps narcotizing them by means of substitutes and sublimations, can be made to work. It only sows the seeds of future irritation and unrest, and ultimately, of conflict. In fact the future of our society looks rather dark. We are in danger of

having a mechanical efficiency system imposed upon us in industry, while we are forced to undergo the dominance of an iron framework of a state, both of which outrage the instincts of man, selected in long past ages when the conditions of living were wholly unlike those of the present. From the newer theories of social reorganization, such as socialism and guild socialism, and the movements for women suffrage, and the amelioration of industrial conditions, less is to be expected possibly than from the conditions which they would replace, for they would only tighten our external bonds the more closely upon us. Certainly Professor Patrick was not a radical in economics or in politics.

Nor was he an apologist for an unregulated individualism, leaving man to the sweet indulgence of his instinctive commands. The existing mores seemed pretty good to him, although it can scarcely be doubted that instinct is not given full fling in our present world. It is here that we find the hiatus in his argument. He recognizes that instinct must be controlled, but he fails to tell us why it cannot be manipulated in favor of the social order of the newer idealists as well as it has been in behalf of the older—and admittedly largely discredited—idealists. This is a point which those who invoke instinct against social reforms, without loving the instincts for themselves, should never forget—if they wish to be water-tight in their logic. In the end he falls back upon education and comes dangerously near to identifying himself with the general viewpoint of those he criticizes specifically. This book is stimulating, if not always profound, and if it has imbedded in it a bias which weakens its logic, that does not render it altogether unique among treatises of this sort.

The most pertinent criticism due all three of these books is perhaps that they have fallen prey to the current craze which holds that man is but a bundle of instincts (Tansley invokes instinct 469 times and Patrick 207 times). The pendulum has swung not merely healthily away from the old intellectualistic interpretation, but it has gone entirely to the opposite extreme. Habit as a factor in social control seems to have been forgotten. To the long list of exploded hobbies in social science, including the intellectualistic, the economic, and the materialistic interpretations, among others, shall we not some day sadly add the dogma of biological determinism, which now our more sanguine thinkers find an explain-all for puzzling points in social theory?

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